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ABSTRACT
A prime function of many major World Wide Web appli-
cations is Online Service Allocation (OSA), the function of
matching individual consumers with particular services/goods
(which may include loans or jobs as well as products) each
with its own producer. In the applications of interest, con-
sumers are free to choose, so OSA usually takes the form of
personalized recommendation or search in practice. The per-
formance metrics of recommender and search systems cur-
rently tend to focus on just one side of the match, in some
cases the consumers (e.g. satisfaction) and in other cases the
producers (e.g., profit). However, a sustainable OSA plat-
form needs benefit both consumers and producers; otherwise
the neglected party eventually may stop using it.
In this paper, we show how to adapt economists’ tradi-
tional idea of maximizing total surplus (the sum of consumer
net benefit and producer profit) to the heterogeneous world
of online service allocation, in an effort to promote the web
intelligence for social good in online eco-systems. Modifica-
tions of traditional personalized recommendation algorithms
enable us to apply Total Surplus Maximization (TSM) to
three very different types of real-world tasks – e-commerce,
P2P lending and freelancing. The results for all three tasks
suggest that TSM compares very favorably to currently pop-
ular approaches, to the benefit of both producers and con-
sumers.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
[Applied Computing]: Law, Social and Behavioral Sciences-
Economics; [Human-Centered Computing]: Collabora-
tive and Social Computing- Collaborative Filtering
Keywords
Total Surplus Maximization; Online Service Allocation; Com-
putational Economics; Recommendation Systems; Web-based
Services
1. INTRODUCTION
Online applications and services have grown tremendously
in recent years. Consumers find producers on E-commerce
websites like Amazon or via social networks like Facebook,
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borrowers and lenders find each other via P2P lending ser-
vices like Prosper, and freelancing websites like Amazon Me-
chanical Turk and Upwork match short term workers with
employers. Such online service allocation seems destined to
grow rapidly in the years ahead.
Because consumers typically have the right and the ability
to choose freely among available online services, an enforced
allocation is usually impractical. Service allocation therefore
is typically performed online via search [4] and recommenda-
tion [30] systems. Search engines, such as Google or Amazon
product search, leverage knowledge about consumers’ inten-
tions, while the many recommender systems for products or
social networks try to infer consumer needs without explicit
user queries.
By its nature, service allocation is a two-sided matching
activity, e.g., of consumers with producers. Economists since
Adam Smith (1776) [1] have taken a balanced view of service
allocation. The key insight is that maximizing total surplus
– the sum of producers’ profit and consumers’ net benefit
– is in the best interest of society, and potentially enables
both sides to be better off than they would be when that
maximum is not achieved.
Existing recommendation systems in online service match-
ing platforms typically lack this balanced perspective. Most
are designed with a focus on the benefits to only one side,
while the benefits of the other side can be ignored or even
sacrificed, because there is always a potential conflict of in-
terest between consumers and producers [13]. For example,
the widely adopted Collaborative Filtering (CF) [30, 37] ap-
proach for recommendation is based on the preferences of
consumers, and the benefits of producers play little role.
Some online P2P lending systems focus on improving the
revenue of lenders, while neglecting the surplus of borrow-
ers. Such an imbalance is problematic because if one side
does not gain much benefit, it may do better elsewhere and
leave the platform.
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how to opera-
tionalize the economists’ insight in online service allocation
into personalized recommendation systems to solve the prob-
lem for better social good of the online society. We propose a
Total Surplus Maximization (TSM) framework to integrate
both consumer surplus and producer surplus into recom-
mendation systems. By TSM, the system creates a bigger
pie (total surplus) for consumers and producers to divide.
There is a large gap between the traditional application of
the economists’ insight (a competitive market for a uniform
commodity, with lots of small producers and consumers) and
online allocation of very personalized and heterogeneous ser-
vices. To fill the gap, we develop surplus-oriented metrics for
personalized recommendations for heterogeneous products,
and illustrate their use in several online markets.
We will offer evidence that the TSM framework can im-
prove performance to the benefit of both sides. Indeed,
our analysis and results for three real-world datasets (e-
commerce, P2P lending, online freelancing) conclude that
TSM-based recommendation performs better than standard
recommendation techniques on traditional metrics. What’s
more, social society as a whole is better off in terms of total
surplus when better satisfying the needs of both the con-
sumers and the producers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the basic economic concepts we will use. Section 3
presents the Total Surplus Maximization (TSM) framework
for Online Service Allocation (OSA), and Section 4 tailors
it for three typical applications. Results from fitting the
models appear in Section 5. Section 6 notes connections to
related work, and Section 7 offers concluding remarks.
2. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
In this section, we introduce some of the key concepts
and definitions in economics and recommendation systems.
These will form the theoretical basis for our framework to
be described later.
2.1 Utility
In economics, utility is a numerical representation of one’s
preference over some set of goods or services. It is a key
ingredient of rational choice theory [8]. A consumer’s utility
for a given set of goods can be thought of as the amount of
satisfaction experienced from consuming these goods.
For a single good, utility U(q) is a function of the con-
sumed quantity q. If that good is indeed good, then more
is better and the marginal utility is positive, i.e., U ′(q) > 0.
The Law Of Diminishing Marginal Utility [31] states that
there is a decline in the marginal utility a person derives
from consuming each additional unit of the product, i.e.,
U ′′(q) < 0. For example, a hungry person may obtain a
huge amount of satisfaction when consuming the first slice
of bread, but the increase in satisfaction per slice declines
as she consumes more and more slices.
Among the many functional forms that economists employ
for utility, two will be particularly helpful for us. They are
the Exponential Utility:
U(q) =
1− exp(−aq)
a
(1)
and the King-Plosser-Rebelo (KPR) utility:
U(q) = a ln(1 + q). (2)
The parameter a > 0 in Exponential Utility can be in-
terpreted as the person’s absolute risk aversion, but here
it will just represent how fast marginal utility decreases as
consumption increases. The parameter a > 0 in KPR utility
has a similar interpretation. Both functions have the usual
normalization that U(0) = 0, i.e., zero utility for zero con-
sumption. We will regard both functions as money metrics
in the sense of Varian [39].
With those normalizations and interpretations, utility can
be understood in monetary terms. U(q) is the dollar value to
the consumer of being able to consume q units of the good
in question, and U ′(q) is her Willingness To Pay (WTP)
[13, 42], i.e., the maximum amount of money she would pay
to acquire another unit of good. This enables us to align
Figure 1: An intuitive explanation of surplus derived
from marginal utility and marginal cost.
the utility in the same scale as price so as to calculate the
surplus of consumers and producers [12].
2.2 Surplus
Consumer Surplus (CS) is the amount of utility that con-
sumers experience beyond the amount that they pay (i.e.,
the price per unit times number of units). Similarly, Pro-
ducer Surplus (PS) is the amount of revenue that the pro-
ducer earns beyond the (variable) cost of producing those
units.
The consumer and producer surpluses are indicated in Fig-
ure 1, where the demand curve is the marginal utility func-
tion U ′(q), which decreases according to the exposition in
the previous section. The supply curve is the marginal cost
C′(q), which increases according to the Law of Diminishing
Marginal Returns [31].
In a competitive market, the price P is determined by the
equilibrium (intersection) of the two curves. Typically the
preferences of many small buyers and the costs of many small
sellers lie behind the demand and supply curves of the whole
market, but for present purposes it is convenient to think
of a single representative buyer and a single representative
seller. Given the quantity of consumption q = qc, Consumer
Surplus CS is obtained by integrating the marginal utility
that exceeds the price at each unit of consumption until qc:
CS =
∫ qc
0
(
U ′(q)− P )dq = U(qc)− Pqc (3)
and Producer Surplus PS is similarly determined by:
PS =
∫ qc
0
(
P − C′(q))dq = Pqc − C(qc). (4)
Total Surplus TS is defined as the sum surplus gained by
the consumer and producer, which is:
TS = CS + PS = U(qc)− C(qc). (5)
More over, the total surplus of an economic system is the
sum of the surpluses for all parties involved in all the trans-
actions of the system.
We see in Eq.(5) that the price component offsets and
does not affect the total surplus in a single transaction. Of
course, the same is true for any set of transactions, even
if they occur at different prices. This is the source of an
important insight in Economics: the total surplus in a given
set of transactions may be split more or less advantageously
for buyer or for seller, but the only way to increase the total
(potentially making both sides better off) is to change the set
of transactions. Society is best served when social surplus is
maximized, because this provides the largest possible “pie”
to split among all participants.
2.3 Collaborative Filtering
Many online services involve the evaluation of producers
by consumers (or vice versa) through ratings. For exam-
ple, on E-commerce websites such as Amazon, users are al-
lowed to rate the purchases with a numerical star rating of
1∼5; and on online freelancing websites such as Upwork or
Freelancer, such ratings are provided bidirectionally between
employers and freelancers.
The numerical rating rij indicates the satisfaction that
consumer i obtains from good j provided by producer pk. Of
course, since a typical consumer rates only a small portion of
all possible items, most of the rij ratings are missing in real-
world datas. A key task is to predict the missing ratings, in
order to make personalized recommendations for consumers.
We adopt one of the best known prediction methods, Col-
laborative Filtering (CF) [37] based on Latent Factor Models
(LFM) [37, 17]. This gives predicted rating
rˆij = α+ βi + γj + ~x
T
i ~yj , (6)
where α is the global offset, βi and γj are consumer and
item biases, and ~xi and ~yj are the K-dimensional latent
factors of consumer i and item j. Given a set of observed
training records R, the parameter set Θ = {α, βi, γj , ~xi, ~yj}
is obtained via
Θ = argmin
Θ
∑
rij∈R
(
rij − rˆij
)2
+ λΩ(Θ) (7)
and Ω(Θ) is the `2-norm regularization term. The mini-
mization of Eq.(7) can be easily accomplished with Stochas-
tic Gradient Descent (SGD) or Alternating Least Squares
(ALS) algorithms [17].
3. THE FRAMEWORK FOR OSA
In this section, we propose our Total Surplus Maximiza-
tion (TSM) framework for the problem of Online Service
Allocation (OSA). For clarity in organization and easy un-
derstanding, we introduce the key components in a logical
order, and then unify these components to present the whole
framework.
3.1 Problem Formalization
We consider the problem of online service providing, i.e.,
distributing goods among given users, so that the total sur-
plus is maximized during this process. The problem takes as
given a finite set of consumers i = 1, ...,m with preferences
not yet specified, and goods j = 1, ..., n, each of which is
produced by a unique producer k(j) ∈ {1, ..., r}.
Each good is available in limited quantity; Mj ≥ 0 is the
total amount of good j that its producer can supply to the
system. For example, Mj = 1 in online freelancing networks
because each job can only be provided once to only one
freelancer; in P2P lending networks like Prosper, we have
0 < Mj < ∞, which is the amount of money requested by
each loan; for e-commerce websites like Amazon, however,
we can treat Mj =∞ because for most of the normal goods,
the producer can replenish the stock in case of a boosting
market demand.
The Online Service Allocation (OSA) problem thus aims
to find an Allocation Matrix Q = [Qij ]m×n, where Qij ≥ 0
is the quantity that consumer i is provided with good j.
The capacity vector M = [M1,M2, · · · ,Mn] leads to the
feasibility constraint
∑
iQij ≤ Mj for each good j, i.e.,
1TQ ≤ M , where 1 is a column vector of 1’s. In different
real-world application scenarios we may apply extra con-
straints on Q to meet specific task characteristics. For ex-
ample, Qij ∈ N for e-commerce goods, or Qij ∈ {0, 1} for
online freelancing services.
The problem of OSA widely exists and finds its instanti-
ation in a lot of online services or mobile applications wher-
ever there is service consumption. Besides e-commerce, P2P
lending, and freelancing services we exampled here, other
applications include riding services such as Uber and Lyft,
group purchase services such as Groupon, or even lodge rent-
ing services such as Airbnb, etc.
3.2 Personalized Utility
Different consumers may experience different utility even
from the same quantity of the same good. In e-commerce
websites, for example, one with an SLR camera in hand may
obtain a high consumer surplus when supplied with an SLR
lens, however, the surplus may be extremely low when a lens
is provided to someone without a camera. For P2P lending,
similarly, the same amount of money could mean a huge
surplus to someone that is in an urgent need (thus willing
to accept a higher interest rate), while the surplus may be
lower for those who are not that thirsty for money (thus
insists on lower interest rates).
This ‘personalized’ feature of utility makes up the inherent
driving power for service allocation, which makes it reason-
able for us to match the appropriate good with the appropri-
ate consumer so as to maximize the potential total surplus
in the whole system. And this process can come in the form
of personalized recommendation or intelligent marketing as-
sistance to decision makers in practical applications.
In this work, we adopt the personalized utility Uij(q) on
a consumer-to-good level, namely:
Uij(q) =
1− exp(−aijq)
aij
, or Uij(q) = aij ln(1 + q) (8)
where Uij(q) indicates the utility when supplying a quantity
q of good j to consumer i, which is parameterized by the
personalized shape parameter aij .
The estimation procedure for aij varies with the availabil-
ity of data and the applicable economic theory. For example,
we adopt the Law of Zero Surplus for the Last Unit [12] for
the inference of aij in e-commerce, while the property of
percentage surplus is applied in freelancing. We will exposit
in more details in the Model Specification section below.
3.3 Total Surplus Maximization
Given perfect information on the personalized utilities
Uij(q) and the cost function Cj(q) for each good j, the TSM
approach for online service allocation would seek an exact al-
location matrix Q so as to maximize the total social surplus
subject to the relevant constraints:
maximize
Q
∑
i
∑
j
(
Uij(Qij)− Cj(Qij)
)
s.t. 1TQ ≤M, Qij ∈ S
(9)
Table 1: Specifications for three exemplary applications of the Total Surplus Maximization framework.
Application CSij(Qij) PSij(Qij) S M p(Qij) Q¯ij
E-commerce aˆij ln(1 +Qij)− PjQij (Pj − cj)Qij N Mj =∞ p(Qij = q) = λqije−λij /q! λij
P2P Lending (rj − rˆ)Qij (rmaxj − rj)Qij R+ 0 < Mj <∞ Qij ∼ N (µij , σij) µij
Freelancing h(rˆij)sjQij h(rˆkj)sjQij {0,1} Mj = 1 p(Qij = 1) = αij , P (Qij = 0) = 1− αij Iαij=max{αi′j}mi′=1
where S is the set of feasible values for a specific applica-
tion, e.g., S = N for e-commerce and S = {0, 1} for online
freelancing.
However, in practical applications we have only estimates
of utilities and costs, and consumers may not always choose
what appear to be the optimal quantities of goods. To
account for measurement error (or decision error by con-
sumers), we regard observed consumer choice as stochastic.
That is, the elements Qij in allocation matrix Q are random
variables with a probability distribution. For example, when
Qij ∼ N (µij , σij), consumer i chooses good j in quantity µij
with the highest probability, but she may also choose some
different quantity, although with lower probability. There-
fore we pose the service allocation problem as maximizing
expected total surplus:
maximize
Θ(Q)
∑
i
∑
j
∫ (
Uij(Qij)− Cj(Qij)
)
p(Qij)dQij
s.t. 1T
∫
Qp(Q)dQ ≤M, Qij ∈ S
(10)
where p(Qij) is the probability density function of each quan-
tity Qij , p(Q) = [p(Qij)]m×n, and the integral on Q is per
element wise. Here Θ(Q) is the set of feasible distribution
parameters of allocation matrix Q.
The model produces the optimal density functions p(Q) as
the final output, and we take the expectation Q¯ =
∫
Qp(Q)dQ
as the final allocation matrix to make system decisions. This
probabilistic interpretation simplifies the computation in some
applications, as explained in the next section.
4. MODEL SPECIFICATION
We now discuss how to implement our TSM framework
for online service allocation for three different online appli-
cations. Table 1 summarizes key specifications.
4.1 E-commerce
We first estimate personalized utility Uij(q) from con-
sumer purchasing records. Although Uij(q) is not directly
observed in the data, it is subject to the Law of Zero Sur-
plus for the Last Unit [12]: as suggested in Figure 1, a
rational consumer i will purchase quantity qij on good j
because each unit up to that point brings additional sat-
isfaction worth more than the price, but additional units
beyond qij are not worth the price. To spell it out, let
CSij(qij) = Uij(qij) − Pjqij be the consumer surplus ob-
tained from such a purchasing behavior. Then the law of
zero surplus gives us the following constraints:
∆CSij(qij) = CSij(qij)− CSij(qij − 1) ≥ 0
∆CSij(qij + 1) = CSij(qij + 1)− CSij(qij) < 0 (11)
In the spirit of collaborative filtering, we model the per-
sonalized parameter in Eq.(8) as aij = α + βi + γj + ~x
T
i ~yj ,
where ~xi is the K-dimensional consumer latent factor of con-
sumer i, and ~yj is similarly the latent factor corresponding
to good j. Hence, the shape parameters aij become interme-
diate parameters that can be derived from the actual param-
eters Θ = {α, βi, γj , ~xi, ~yj} in model optimization. Based on
this, we maximize the following log-likelihood of observing
the whole purchasing records dataset:
maximize
Θ
log p(D)
=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Iij log
(
Pr
(
∆CSij(qij) ≥ 0
)
Pr
(
∆CSij(qij + 1) < 0
))
−λ(α2 + m∑
i=1
β2i +
n∑
j=1
γ2j +
m∑
i=1
‖~xi‖22 +
n∑
j=1
‖~yj‖22
)
s.t. ~xi, ~yj ≥ 0, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
(12)
where Iij is an indicator whose value is 1 when consumer
i purchased good j in the dataset, and 0 otherwise. The
regularizer with coefficient λ > 0 is used to prevent model
over-fitting. We apply the commonly used non-negative con-
straints [19, 18] on the latent factors {~xi}mi=1 and {~yj}nj=1,
and adopt the sigmoid function to model the probabilities,
which are
Pr
(
∆CSij(qij) ≥ 0
)
=
1
1 + exp(−∆CSij(qij)) (13)
and
Pr
(
∆CSij(qij + 1) < 0
)
= 1− Pr(∆CSij(qij + 1) ≥ 0).
(14)
An optimal solution of Eq.(12) can be obtained by gradi-
ent descent, which involves the computation of the gradients
on the shape parameter aij . To simplify the computation
and make it possible for model estimation, we adopt the
KPR utility function Uij(q) = aij ln(1 + q). After the above
model fitting process, we have the parameter estimates to
compute the shape parameters aˆij . These in turn give us
the personalized utility functions Uij(q)
Uij(q) = aˆij ln(1 + q) = (α+βi +γj +~x
T
i ~yj) ln(1 + q). (15)
To obtain producer surplus we assume constant marginal
cost of selling e-commerce goods. The (variable) cost func-
tion then is C(q) = cjq, where cj is the cost of a unit service
of good j. Because Qij ∈ N, we assume that the elements
Qij in the allocation matrix Q of Eq.(10) follow a Poisson
distribution, i.e.,
p(Qij = q) = λ
q
ije
−λij/q! (16)
where the λij ’s are the distribution parameters. Finally,
the framework for OSA based on total surplus maximization
in Eq.(10) can be specified to the following maximization
problem:
maximize
Λ
∑
i
∑
j
∞∑
q=0
λqije
−λij
q!
(
aˆij ln(1 + q)− cjq
)
− η
∑
i
∑
j
Iij(λij − qij)2
(17)
where Λ = [λij ]m×n is the parameter set, η > 0 is regularizer
coefficient, Iij is still the indicator of whether i purchased j
in the training set, and qij is the actual purchasing quantity.
The quantity constraints are left out because Mj =∞.
In practice, we do not have to sum over infinite q’s to
compute an expectation over Poisson distribution, but only
need to consider sufficiently many choices. In this work, we
choose to sum up from q = 0 to 10 because 10! = 3, 628, 800
is sufficiently large to diminish the residuals according to the
theory of Taylor series expansion.
The minimization of both Eq.(12) and Eq.(17) can be con-
ducted based on gradient descent. Once the distribution pa-
rameters Λ are obtained from Eq.(17), we have the expected
allocation matrix Q¯ as:
Q¯ij =
∞∑
q=0
q · λ
q
ije
−λij
q!
=
∞∑
q=0
λqije
−λij
(q − 1)! = λij (18)
which we take for service allocation and product recommen-
dation. Note that in the regularizer of Eq.(17), λij is actu-
ally the expectation of quantity Qij according to the nature
of Poisson distribution (Eq.(18)). As a result, the regulariza-
tion component applies a guidance to the learning process,
so that the estimated allocation quantities for those observed
transections in the training dataset would be close to their
actual values.
4.2 Online Peer-to-Peer Lending
In P2P lending services like Prosper, the borrowers are
loan request producers, since the loan requests can be viewed
as financial products. The lenders are consumers of these
financial products. Here the OSA problem is how the lenders
(i.e., consumers) should distribute their assets among the
loan requests (i.e., determining the allocation matrix Q), so
that total surplus in the system is maximized.
In a standard online lending process, the borrower (re-
quest producer) k initiates a loan request j by specifying
two features: the size of the loan Mj , and its maximal inter-
est rate rmaxj that she is willing to offer. Once a request is
generated, the lenders (request consumers) i bid the request
by providing the amount of money they would like to lend
and the interest rates they ask for, which should be lower
than or equal to rmaxj . When the total amount of money in
bid exceeds the request in a given time period, the loan re-
quest then makes a deal, and the top bidders (those with the
lowest interest rates) whose money amounts to the request
win the bid. The highest interest rate among the winners is
set as the final interest rate rj for the loan j.
The consumer surplus for the lenders is the interest they
obtain from this loan rjQij , less the opportunity cost rˆQij
of investing the money in other ways. For simplicity, we set
rˆ as the risk-free interest rate (e.g., to save the money in
bank). As a result, we have:
CSij(Qij) = (rj − rˆ)Qij (19)
Similarly, the producer surplus for the borrowers is the
interest they would be willing to pay rmaxj Qij , less the actual
interest they have to pay rjQij , namely,
PSij(Qij) = (r
max
j − rj)Qij (20)
Thus the total surplus is:
TSij(Qij) = CSij(Qij) + PSij(Qij) = (r
max
j − rˆ)Qij (21)
Because Qij represents the quantity of money that is a
continuous variable, we apply a normal distribution to de-
scribe Qij , i.e., Qij ∼ N (µij , σij).
Expected total surplus maximization in Eq.(10) for P2P
lending thus becomes
maximize
U,Σ
∑
i
∑
j
∫
(rmaxj − rˆ)Qij√
2piσij
exp
(
− (Qij − µij)
2
2σ2ij
)
dQij
s.t. 1T
∫
Q√
2piΣ
exp
(
− (Q− U)
2
2Σ2
)
dQ ≤M,Qij ∈ R+
(22)
where U = [µij ]m×n and Σ = [σij ]m×n are the parameters.
This boils down to:
maximize
U,Σ
∑
i
∑
j
µij(r
max
j − rˆ)
s.t. 1TU ≤M, µij ∈ R+
(23)
which can be solved to find the optima with linear program-
ming. Finally, we take the expected quantity under Gaus-
sian distribution as the allocation matrix, i.e.,
Q¯ij = µij (24)
This result is interesting in that, it allows us to allocate
the investments in a greedy manner according to the per
capita surplus (rmaxj − rˆ) of each loan request, which is an
intuitional rule for investment in practice and easily appli-
cable in real-world systems.
4.3 Online Freelancing Platforms
In online freelancing networks like Mturk and Upwork,
the employer (job producer) k posts job j online, and the
freelancers (job consumers) i apply for the jobs that they
are willing to take. Because a job can only be assigned to a
single freelancer and a freelancer can only decide to take a
job or not rather than take part of a job, the elements Qij
in allocation matrix Q can only be binary values in {0, 1}.
The employer and freelancer negotiate to decide the salary
sj for job j. After the job is accomplished, they make ratings
on each other which indicates their satisfaction about the
other side. We denote the rating given by freelancer i and
employer k about the job j as rij and rkj , respectively, which
are integers in a specific rating scale.
To estimate the consumer and producer surplus experi-
enced on a given job, we adopt the economic assumption
that the percentage surplus against the price that the con-
sumer pays or the producer obtains is proportional to the
normalized ratings that they cast on each other [12, 42], i.e.,
a higher rating implies a higher percentage surplus.
To do so, we predict the freelancer-job ratings rˆij and
employer-job ratings rˆkj , respectively, based on the Collab-
orative Filtering (CF) approach of Eq.(7) introduced in sec-
tion 2.3. By the sigmoid function h(x) = 2
1+exp(−x) − 1, we
further model the percentage surplus for freelancers as:
Uij(Qij)− sj
sj
= h(rˆij)Qij =
(
2
1 + e−rˆij
− 1
)
Qij (25)
and the percentage producer surplus as:
sj − Cj(Qij)
sj
= h(rˆkj)Qij =
(
2
1 + e−rˆkj
− 1
)
Qij (26)
where Qij ∈ {0, 1} can be viewed as a binary indicator that
whether or not a job is assigned, so that a surplus can be
obtained for consumers and producers in Eq.(25) and (26).
As a result, the consumer, producer, and total surpluses
implied in a specific job assignment i to j are:
CSij(Qij) = Uij(Qij)− sj = h(rˆij)sjQij
PSij(Qij) = sj − Cj(Qij) = h(rˆkj)sjQij
TSij(Qij) = (h(rˆij) + h(rˆkj)) sjQij
(27)
On considering that Qij is binary valued, we apply a
Bernoulli distribution to model its probabilistic nature, i.e.:
p(Qij = 1) = αij , P (Qij = 0) = 1− αij (28)
where 0 ≤ αij ≤ 1. Let A = [αij ]m×n be the parameter
set, and let Mj = 1 because each individual job is by nature
provided only once. The OSA problem for online freelancing
services is thus specified as:
maximize
A
∑
i
∑
j
(h(rˆij) + h(rˆkj)) sjαij
s.t. 1TA ≤ 1, 0 ≤ αij ≤ 1
(29)
Eq.(29) can be easily optimized using linear programming.
Once the parameters in A = [αij ]m×n are obtained, we as-
sign the job j to the freelancer i of the maximum probability
αij among αi′j of all the freelancers on that job, namely:
Q¯ij =
{
1, if αij = max{αi′j}mi′=1
0, otherwise
(30)
This result is intuitive because it can also be achieved in a
greedy manner by replacing αij with Qij in Eq.(29). In this
way, we assign a given job j to the freelancer i who gains the
highest value regarding (h(rˆij) + h(rˆkj)) sj , which is actu-
ally a specification of the direct non-probabilistic framework
in Eq.(9). Furthermore, this can be viewed as a surplus-
augmented version of the traditional CF-based personalized
recommendation algorithms, which will be discussed in the
following together with the previous specifications.
4.4 Remarks
It is worthwhile to compare and contrast our framework
with some traditional recommendation algorithms.
In the case of unlimited quantity where Mj = ∞, the
quantity constraint 1T
∫
Qp(Q)dQ ≤ M in Eq.(10) can be
removed and we obtain an unconstrained optimization func-
tion, just as shown in Eq.(17). In this case, the total surplus
related to each consumer is independent from those of the
others, and the optimal allocations for each consumer is in-
dependently isolated from each other. Take the e-commerce
application for example, the allocation for a given consumer
i can be obtained with the following equation:
maximize
{λij}nj=1
∑
j
( ∞∑
q=0
(
aˆij ln(1 + q)
)
λqije
−λij
q!
− λijcj
)
− ηΩ(Θ)
(31)
This is similar to traditional Personalized Recommender
System (PRS) [30] algorithms, where we consider the pref-
erences of each targeted user and aim to provide the most
relevant recommendations. The spirit of personalization has
been inherently incorporated in the design of the personal-
ized utility of Eq.(15), where aˆij = α + βi + γj + ~x
T
i ~yj de-
scribes the consumer preference towards the goods in a col-
laborative manner based on the latent factors learned from
the wisdom of the crowds, which is similar to the Collabo-
rative Filtering approach in Section 2.3.
Similarly for online freelancing application denoted in Eq.(29),
we see that for a given target job j, the employer-job rating
h(rˆkj) (predicted by CF) and the hourly salary sj would be
known values. As a result, the greedy weight (h(rˆij) + h(rˆkj)) sj
will only depend on the freelancer i. In this sense, we are
actually assigning the job j to the freelancer i of the maxi-
mized h(rˆij)sj . This is actually a generalization of CF-based
algorithms that recommend job j to the freelancer i of the
maximum predicted rating rˆij , where the only difference is
that we further take the hourly salary sj into consideration
for a maximized total surplus that is measured on a basis of
money.
Another interesting yet intuitive conclusion from the ex-
istence of a non-infinity solution to Eq.(31) is that, larger
quantity of products that the producers sell is not necessar-
ily preferred by the system, although we assume the quan-
tities that producers can supply are unlimited. This results
from the diminishing marginal utility experienced by con-
sumers, and this conclusion is verified by the disadvantages
observed on dumping in practical tradings.
However, when the constraint on quantity exists, the con-
sumer surpluses are correlated with each other, so that the
allocation matrix that gains a globally maximized total sur-
plus does not necessarily imply a maximized surplus for each
consumer or producer.
5. RESULTS
In this section, we take our framework to the data, and
perform the traditional tasks of purchase prediction and per-
sonalized recommendation, as well as the new task of total
surplus maximization. We first present a more detailed de-
scription of the e-commerce application, which we think is
one of the most representative and easy-to-understand appli-
cation scenarios that match the economic theories. Then we
briefly sketch results on P2P lending and online freelancing
applications, to illustrate the scope of our framework.
5.1 E-commerce Dataset Description
We adopt the consumer purchasing records dataset from
Shop.com1 for model evaluation, because an important in-
formation source leveraged in our framework is the quan-
tity of product that a consumer purchased in each transac-
tion, which is absent in many of the public datasets. In the
Shop.com dataset, however, we have both the product price
information and the quantity that a consumer purchased in
each record.
To avoid the problem of cold-start [21, 41], and to focus on
our key research target of total surplus maximization, we se-
lect those consumers and products with at least five purchas-
ing records, which is a frequently adopted pre-processing
method in previous work [21, 20, 37]. Some statistics of our
dataset are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Statistics of the Shop.com dataset
#Consumers #Products #Transactions Density Train/Test
34,099 42,691 400,215 0.03% 75%/25%
We see that the dataset is extremely sparse with a density
of only 0.03%, which is similar to previously seen recommen-
1http://www.shop.com
dation tasks. Furthermore, we randomly select 75% of the
transactions from each consumer to construct the training
set for model learning, and the rest 25% are used for test-
ing. These amount to roughly 100k transactions by 34k
consumers on 30k products in the testing dataset.
5.2 Parameter Selection and Estimation
The personalized KPR utility function Uij(q) indicated
in Eq.(15) is parameterized solely by parameter aij , and the
estimation of aij boils down to the inference of consumer and
product biases and latent factors by optimizing Eq.(12).
In the estimates, we set the hyper-parameter λ involved
in Eq.(12) and η in Eq.(17) based on cross validation, and
they are primarily set as λ = 0.05 and η = 5, unless we tune
these parameters to investigate their influences on model
performance. Throughout the estimation procedure we set
the number of latent factors (i.e., the dimensions of ~xi and
~yj) K = 20 in Eq.(12), because we find that 20 factors are
sufficiently enough to stable the model performance.
Once the estimated aˆij ’s are obtained with Eq.(12), we are
able to evaluate the utility Uij(q) of an arbitrary consumer-
product pair, which allows us to learn the average allocation
quantities λij in Eq.(17). Recognizing that λij is consumer-
product specific similar to aij , we once again parameterize
it in a CF manner with λij = α
′ + β′i + γ
′
j + ~x
′T
i ~y
′
j , and
thus λij can be estimated as a media parameter by gradient
descending on Θ′ = {α′, β′i, γ′j , ~x′i, ~y′j}.
For simplicity, we set the cost cj = 0.5Pj for all the prod-
ucts in the dataset, where Pj is the price of a product j.
The cost ratio 0.5 is an average estimation based on the
surveys of 100 producers from different product categories.
Besides, we find that the performance of our framework is
not sensitive to different cost ratios in a reasonable range.
Please note that when the regularization term η in Eq.(17)
is set sufficiently large, the effect of total surplus component
will vanish and the equation turns into a mere CF problem
to predict qij , which serves a baseline algorithm in our later
comparative study.
The procedure ends up with the estimated values of λij
for any given consumer-product pair in our dataset. As sug-
gested by Eq.(18), product recommendation list is thus pro-
vided to consumer i by ranking the products in descending
order of λij . For easy reference, the values of the involved
hyper parameters are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Summary of parameters. The number of
latent factors K and the CF regularization coeffi-
cient λ are identified by cross validation, and are
fixed throughout the reported results; η varies so as
to examine its influence; cj is the marginal cost of
product j.
#Latent factors K λ in Eq.(12) η in Eq.(17) cj in Eq.(17)
20 0.05 5 0.5Pj
5.3 Purchase Prediction and Recommendation
We investigated the performance of our TSM framework
for the task of personalized purchase prediction and rec-
ommendation. For performance comparison, we adopt the
widely used CF algorithm in Eq.(6) and (7) to predict the
purchasing quantities directly, which are integer values rang-
ing from 1 to 20. For fair comparison, the hyper-parameters
K and λ are set the same as those in Table 4.
Similar to our TSM framework, once the predicted quan-
tities are obtained, we construct the top-N recommendation
list for a consumer from the testing set in descending order of
the quantities. We adopt the measure Conversion-Rate@N
(CR@N) for performance evaluation on top-N recommenda-
tion, which is a typical metric widely adopted in real-world
e-commerce systems [7].
For a given number of testing consumers and the recom-
mendation lists of length N for each of them, CR@N is the
percentage of lists that ‘hit’ the purchase records in testing
set for the target consumer. In our exercise, N runs from
1 up to 100. For each consumer in the testing set, there
are as many as 30k candidate products for recommendation,
and all the candidate products are present in the training
dataset. For computational efficiency in evaluation, we ran-
domly select 1000 users to evaluate average CR at each time,
and the CR performance of 30 testing rounds are averaged
to provide the final evaluation results.
The results for CF and our TSM framework with differ-
ent choices on regularization coefficient η = 0.1, 1, 5, 10 with
recommendation length N = 5, 10, 20 are presented in Table
3. And more complete results for N from 1 to 100 can be
seen in Figure 2. The bolded improvements in Table 3 are
significant at a 0.05 level.
The results show that our TSM framework outperforms
CF for most choices of regularization coefficient η and rec-
ommendation length N . An interesting observation is that
the performance of TSMη generally degrades with the in-
crease of η on relatively long recommendation lists, all the
way towards the performance given by the baseline algo-
rithm of CF. This is actually reasonable as stated before,
because when η →∞, TSM literally degenerates to CF and
its performance will also converge to CF. This observation
further emphasizes the importance of our surplus maximiza-
tion component, and it suggests that maximizing with total
surplus could be beneficial to the consumer experience on
personalized recommendations.
Besides, the results also suggest that the choice of η should
not be too small either, which would dismiss the quantity
guidance of the observed purchases, especially for top preci-
sions in shorter recommendation lists. One possible reason
can be that without the quantity guidance, λij would mostly
depend on the personalized KPR utility Uij . As KPR util-
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Figure 2: Comparison of the recommendation per-
formance for CF and TSMη. The y-axis is the con-
version rate, and the x-axis is the length N of each
recommendation list.
Table 3: Evaluation on Conversion Rate (CR@N) and Total Surplus (TS@N) for Top-N recommendation,
where TSM∗ stands for our TSM approach with regularization coefficient η = ∗ in Eq.(17).
N 5 10 20
Method CF TSM0.1 TSM1 TSM5 TSM10 CF TSM0.1 TSM1 TSM5 TSM10 CF TSM0.1 TSM1 TSM5 TSM10
CR (%) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.60 0.50
TS ($) 33.05 1009.45 1009.45 422.01 24.48 57.89 2278.36 2208.50 807.56 213.45 98.09 2892.03 3135.35 1137.89 676.65
ity function is rather limited in terms of shape flexibility, it
could fail to describe the actual consumer utility for some
products. We actually confirmed this by predicting the pur-
chase quantities using the constraints in Eq.(11) directly,
and the predictions turned out rather inaccurate with larger
root mean squared error (RMSE) than that by CF. In sum-
mary, η influences the performance by balancing the impor-
tance between total surplus and quantity guidance, and it
should be properly selected in practical applications.
5.4 Evaluation on Total Surplus
In this section, we closely examine the performance of our
framework under the total surplus metric, which is a core
notion of this work. The evaluation is carried out based on
the recommendation results from the above section. Similar
to the Top-N conversion rate, we are interested in calculating
the accumulated tocial surplus of a Top-N recommendation
list for each user, which is defined as,
TS@N =
1
M
M∑
i=1
∑
j∈Πi,N
(aˆij ln(1 + λij)− cjλij) (32)
where i and M are the index and the total number of testing
consumers, respectively, N is the length of recommendation
list, and Πi,N is the length-N personalized recommendation
list for the i-th consumer.
Similarly, the resulted of TS@N are reported in Table 3,
and a full scope report under comprehensive choices of N
can be found in Figure 3.
It can be seen from the results that our TSM approach
consistently outperforms the CF method. This result is ac-
tually not surprising because our TSM framework is by na-
ture able to maximize the total surplus by Eq.(17). Besides,
we find that the smaller η is, the more total surplus our
TSM approach gains. This observation on the influence of η
further verifies the effects of the surplus maximization com-
ponent and the quantity guidance in Eq.(17).
More interestingly, when combining this result with that
on recommendation in the previous section, we find that our
TSM framework can achieve decent results in terms of both
total surplus and conversion rate when η is properly set.
This is exciting because our framework is able to benefit the
social good on total surplus, and at the same time improves
the consumer experience in personalized recommendations.
5.5 P2P Lending Networks
To investigate the performance on Peer-to-Peer loan net-
works, we use the datasets from a famous P2P lending web-
site Prosper2[6]. Beginning from the third quarter in 2009,
Prosper introduced an automatic bidding mechanism that
bids the listings (i.e., loan requests) on behalf of the lenders
automatically once a listing is created. However, as we in-
tend to investigate the behaviour of consumers and produc-
ers in an economic system, we prefer the decisions made
2http://www.prosper.com
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Figure 3: Comparison on Tocial Surplus (TS) for CF
and TSMη. Note that TS@N means the total social
surplus of the top N recommendations when they
are all accepted by the corresponding consumer.
directly by themselves, instead of those indirectly by the al-
gorithms. As a result, we adopt those listing and bidding
records before this mechanism was launched, which finally
covers the period from November 9th 2005 to May 8th 2009.
As we do not consider risk control in our current model,
we select those successfully funded listings whose status are
not Defaulted, Cancelled or Charge-off from the dataset,
because these listings are meant to be ruled out from the
system by the intelligent risk control mechanisms. Finally,
our dataset involves those funded listings of the status Cur-
rent, Late, Payoff in Progress, or Paid, which correspond
to 46,680 listings, 1,814,503 bids, and a total amount of
$157,845,684 fundings. Some statistics of these records are
summarized in Table 5.
Table 5: Statistics of the selected Prosper dataset,
where ‘rate’ represents the interest rate of a loan.
#Listings #Lenders #Bids TotalAmount
46,680 49,631 1,814,503 $157,845,684
MinimumRate MaximumRate AverageRate Amount/Listing
0.0001 0.4975 0.1662 $3,381.44
To calculate the total surplus reached by an arbitrary al-
location Q = [Qij ]m×n, we take the yearly average bank
deposit interest rate rˆ = 0.01 as the risk-free interest rate,
and the TS for P2P loaning can be calculated as:
TSP2P =
∑
i
∑
j
Qij(r
max
j − rˆ) (33)
Based on this, the results on total surplus for the actual
allocations (Actual) and our Total Surplus Maximization
(TSM) framework are shown as follows:
Table 6: Results on total surplus with and without
our Total Surplus Maximization (TSM) framework.
TS($) TS/Listing($) TS/capita($)
Actual 25,174,131 539.29 0.1595
TSM 33,838,364 724.90 0.2144
The estimates indicate that the TSM framework achieves
34.42% higher total and per listing/capita surplus, from
$0.16 per capita to $0.21 per capita, which is a major im-
provement in efficiency for the online lending systems. Based
on two-tailed t-test on the large amount of listings, the im-
provements are significant at a 0.01 level.
The improvement on total surplus is not surprising be-
cause our framework intends to achieve a maximized surplus
among all the possible allocations. However, we should fur-
ther verify that our allocations are acceptable to the lenders
in practice. As a result, we calculate the Percentage of Paid
(PoP) listings among all the funded listings in our dataset,
which indicates the safety factor of a funding allocation.
Results show that the PoP among all the listings in our
selected dataset is 69.37%, while the PoP among the funded
listings of our TSM allocation is 73.32%, which is no lower
than the actual PoP. This suggests that our TSM framework
is able to improve efficiency without impairing the safety of
the system.
5.6 Online Freelancing
We used the dataset from Zhubajie3(ZBJ) for empirical
verification of online freelancing applications. ZBJ is a fa-
mous Chinese online marketplace website that includes on-
line jobs across various categories. Each employment record
includes the employer, freelancer, and job IDs, the hourly
salary, as well as the employer-job and freelancer-job rat-
ings, which are integers ranging from 0 to 5. Some of the
basic statistics of the dataset that we collected are summa-
rized in Table 7.
Table 7: Some key statistics of the ZBJ dataset.
#Employers #Freelancers #Jobs AverageSalary
40,228 46,856 296,453 U21.68/hr
#Employer #Freelancer Average Emp- Average Free-
Ratings Ratings loyer Rating lancer Rating
276,103 241,638 2.336 2.405
Similar to our e-commerce application, we make job rec-
ommendations to freelancers based on the allocation matrix
produced by our framework, then verify the performance on
this task. To do so, we take all the freelancer-job ratings, and
conduct personalized recommendation based on Collabora-
tive Filtering (CF). In CF, a job j is assigned to freelancer i
who has the highest predicted rating rˆij , while in our Total
Surplus Maximization (TSM) framework, it is assigned to
the freelancer where Qij = 1 according to Eq.(30).
We conduct five-fold cross-validation for both methods,
and we still adopt the Conversion Rate (CR) for performance
evaluation, which is the percentage of properly assigned jobs
in the testing dataset. Results of TSM and CF methods are
presented in Table 8, under different choices of the number
of latent factors K used for rating prediction (see Eq.(6)).
Table 8: Conversion rate on job recommendation.
K 5 10 20 30 40 50
CF(%) 0.165 0.216 0.244 0.258 0.262 0.266
TSM(%) 0.384 0.421 0.453 0.486 0.507 0.512
Results show that our TSM framework gains consistently
better performance on conversion rate for job recommenda-
tion. The improvements are significant at 0.01 level for all
choices of latent factors K. According to the discussions in
3http://www.zbj.com
Section 4.4, the improvement comes from the inherent con-
sideration of salary rate in our model, which implies that the
salary could be an extremely important factor when free-
lancers seek for jobs. Besides, we see that the results tend
to be stable when K ≥ 40 for both methods, which means
that a dimensionality of 40 could be sufficiently enough to
describe the factors considered by freelancers.
We further calculate the total surplus for the allocations
given by CF and TSM under different choices of K’s. Once
an arbitrary allocation Q = [Qij ]m×n is realized in practice,
we obtain the total surplus as:
TSFr =
∑
i
∑
j
(h(rˆij) + h(rˆkj)) sjQij (34)
We calculate the total surplus for each of the five testing
folds, where there are 59,291 job allocations on average in
each fold. Finally, the averaged total surplus among the five
folds are shown in Table 9, where the surplus is measured in
CNY (U) and ‘m’ is for ‘million’.
Table 9: Total surplus of online freelancing job allo-
cations under typical choices of latent factor K.
K 5 10 20 30 ActualAllocation
CF(U) 1.562m 1.758m 1.824m 1.860m
2,593,618
TSM(U) 3.235m 3.862m 4.270m 4.336m
The improvements on total surplus are significant at 0.001
level for all choices of K. We see that our TSM framework
consistently gains more surplus than CF. It even leads to
more surplus than the actual surplus of the testing dataset.
The TSM framework gains a total surplus of U73.13/job on
a job-level when K = 30, while that for the CF approach
and the actual allocation are U31.37/job and U43.74/job,
respectively.
The fact that the total surplus of the actual allocation is
less than that gained by our TSM approach implies the fail-
ure of market equilibrium, which is frequently observed by
economists in the research of antitrust and market regula-
tions. For online freelancing as an example, this comes from
the problem of information asymmetry between freelancers
and employers, because it could be impossible for the free-
lancers to browse millions of jobs to make a final decision.
This further stresses the importance of personalized recom-
mendation techniques in service allocation, which help to
push the appropriate jobs to freelancers, so as to overcome
the problem of information overload.
When putting the evaluation results on total surplus and
recommendation together, we find it extremely exciting be-
cause our TSM framework leads to better market efficiency
even than the practical market of the system, while at the
same time it benefits the freelancers with more acceptable
job recommendations. This means that our allocation solu-
tion may well be applied in practice for a better off in online
markets compared with current actually adopted recommen-
dation techniques.
6. RELATEDWORK
In mainstream economics, economic surplus [13, 9, 2], also
known as total welfare or Marshallian surplus [25] (named
after Alfred Marshall), refers to three closely related quan-
tities: consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social/total
surplus, where social surplus is the sum of surpluses expe-
rienced by both consumers and producers. The research
of surplus has had quite a long history in the progress of
economical theories, dating back to as early as the 19th cen-
tury with the initial understandings of Surplus Values [26,
27], when the gigantic increase in wealth and population
brought by the First and Second Industrial Revolution drove
economists to investigate the nature of economical increase
[33].
In modern economics, the concept of social surplus has
been widely adopted by economists for economic system
analysis and mechanism design, usually as a direct measure
of social good to benefit the good of our human society [13,
28, 3]. However, although the Web has formed itself as a
virtual society by continuously integrating the human ac-
tivities from oﬄine to online, the research community still
has seldomly investigated the surplus nature of the Web as
a social system.
Actually, a large number of Web-based services can be for-
malized as consumer-producer interaction systems, includ-
ing the most commonly used E-commerce websites [23, 35],
online financing [22, 6], crowd-sourcing systems [10, 5], and
even social networks [32, 15], where the consumers consume
normal goods, financial products, freelancing jobs, or infor-
mation from the corresponding producers therein.
These applications raise the practical problem of match-
ing services from producers to consumers. Perhaps the most
closely related tasks for such matching processes are Person-
alized Recommendation [11, 30, 16] and Search [4, 24, 14],
which feed the implicit or explicit needs of the users with
recommendations and search results.
However, current approaches for such tasks mainly focus
on the benefits of one side without explicitly modeling the
benefits of the Web system as a whole. For example, the
widely adopted Collaborative Filtering (CF) [11, 17, 38, 36,
29, 34, 40] techniques for personalized recommendation in-
herently focus on the maximization of consumer satisfac-
tion based on their preferences. Although the satisfaction of
consumers intuitionally benefits the surplus of producers by
improving the potential of user clicks, there is no direct guar-
antee that such a single-side oriented modeling can benefit
both sides.
In this work, however, we view the Web as a virtual society
and propose to maximize the social surplus directly, based
on well-developed and widely-accepted economic concepts
and conclusions, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the
first time to do so in the context of web-based applications.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Most existing literature on recommender systems focuses
on developing new algorithms for standard evaluation met-
ric such as RMSE, conversion rate or click through rate.
There is little research on some fundamental questions, such
as what metrics should be used to evaluate recommender
systems and to what extent do the metrics reflect the goals
of users, producers, platform providers, and the overall Web
economy.
This paper is our first step towards finding principled an-
swers to these questions based on established economic the-
ory. Considering a recommender system as an information
agent to support two-sided matching tasks, we introduce
established economic surplus theory into recommender sys-
tems and meld it with recent data driven algorithmic ap-
proaches. Our proposed Total Surplus Maximization frame-
work integrates the goals of users and suppliers, which can
be a good metric to optimize for platform providers as it
better reflects the overall economic value of the online sys-
tem. We have illustrated how to realize this framework for
different recommendation systems. The empirical results for
several sets of industry data demonstrated the effectiveness
of the proposed framework.
This paper focuses on the broadest metric about efficiency,
or maximization of total surplus, and this inherent principle
is not restricted to recommendation tasks that we primar-
ily investigated, but applicable to the whole research effort
of web intelligence for social good. In the future, we will
also examine performance metrics about its two major com-
ponents: producer surplus and consumer surplus. We can
also try the ideas on new datasets, compare different func-
tional form and specifications of utilities and profits. We
will implement it both in static (one-time) and dynamic
(multi-period/session/page) recommendation or search set-
tings, and evaluate with real users to see the short term and
long term impact of the total surplus based framework.
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